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Essay 
Revisiting Dreyfus: A More Complete 
Account of a Trial by Mathematics 
D.H. Kaye† 
Courts have struggled with “probability evidence.”1 A few 
have tried to expel nearly all quantitative assessments of evi-
dence.2 Others have propounded complex and arbitrary rules of 
admissibility.3 Still others have uncritically, and perhaps un-
 
†  Regents’ Professor, Arizona State University Sandra Day O’Connor 
College of Law, and Fellow, Center for the Study of Law, Science and Technol-
ogy. J.D., Yale Law School; M.A., Harvard University; B.S., Massachusetts In-
stitute of Technology. I am grateful to George Fisher, William Kruskal, Paul 
Meier, and Hans Zeisel for their comments on drafts of this paper, to Marcelle 
Chase for locating records of the Dreyfus proceedings, and to Fernando Téson 
for verifying the translations of certain documents. Copyright © 2007 D.H. 
Kaye. All rights reserved. 
 1. By “probability evidence,” I mean quantitative expressions, derived 
with the aid of the mathematical theory of probability, of the chance that cer-
tain events will occur. Such evidence or argument rarely is relevant in itself, 
but is supposed to assist the judge or jury in evaluating the probative force of 
facts established by other testimony, such as an apparent match in handwrit-
ing characteristics, in blood types, in hair fibers, and so on. For surveys of 
leading cases of involving probability evidence and efforts to extract useful 
principles from them, see 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 209, at 904 (Kenneth 
S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006); D.H. Kaye, The Admissibility of “Probability Evi-
dence” in Criminal Trials (pts. 1 & 2), 26 JURIMETRICS J. 343 (1986), 27 JURI-
METRICS J. 160 (1987) [hereinafter Kaye, Probability Evidence]. A deeper 
analysis can be found in DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE, A TREA-
TISE ON EVIDENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE § 12.4 (2004) [hereinafter KAYE ET AL., 
THE NEW WIGMORE]. 
 2. See State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 428–29 (Minn. 1989); State v. 
Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544, 548–49 (Minn. 1987); State v. Boyd, 331 N.W.2d 480, 
482–83 (Minn. 1983); State v. Carlson, 267 N.W.2d 170, 175–76 (Minn. 1978). 
But see State v. Bloom, 516 N.W.2d 159, 167 (Minn. 1994) (creating an excep-
tion to the Minnesota rule prohibiting testimony regarding some probabilities 
for DNA evidence). 
 3. See, e.g., D.H. Kaye, The Probability of an Ultimate Issue: The Strange 
Cases of Paternity Testing, 75 IOWA L. REV. 75 (1989) (discussing the intricate 
rules of admissibility that have arisen with respect to paternity testing). 
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comprehendingly, accepted such assessments.4 This Essay ex-
amines one notorious case that has been said to fall in the last 
category, the Dreyfus case. In a brilliant and influential article 
published over thirty years ago, Professor Laurence Tribe pre-
sented the case as a prime example of the irresistible power of 
even grossly fallacious mathematical demonstrations to over-
whelm a legal tribunal.5 Not long afterward, Justice Douglas 
reiterated this view of the extraordinary power of mathematical 
evidence to confound court and counsel.6 A distinguished na-
tional panel also described the Dreyfus case as showing “the 
ability of mathematical evidence to paralyze critical examina-
tion.”7 And, as the Minnesota Supreme Court attempted for the 
sixth time to fashion reasonable rules for the admission of ex-
pert testimony about DNA evidence,8 one Justice insisted that 
 
 4. See Kaye, Probability Evidence (pt. 2), supra note 1, at 163–67. The 
most recent and notorious abuse of criminal probability evidence occurred in 
the prosecution of Sally Clark for allegedly murdering her two children. See, 
e.g., Kevin Barraclough, Book Review, 329 BRIT. MED. J. 177, 177 (2004) (re-
viewing JOHN BATT, STOLEN INNOCENCE: A MOTHER’S FIGHT FOR JUSTICE—
THE AUTHORISED STORY OF SALLY CLARK (2004)); A.P. Dawid, Bayes’s Theo-
rem and Weighing Evidence by Juries, in BAYES’S THEOREM 71, 75 (Richard 
Swinburne ed., 2002); Stephen J. Watkins, Conviction by Mathematical Error? 
Doctors and Lawyers Should Get Probability Theory Right, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 
2, 2–3 (2000). 
 5. Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the 
Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1332–34 (1971). 
 6. Hull v. United States, 404 U.S. 893, 895–96 n.3 (1971) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari). Oddly, Hull involved little or no quanti-
fied evidence. Justice Douglas would have reversed a smuggling conviction be-
cause the government lacked direct evidence that defendants—who were walk-
ing on a highway, close to two knapsacks of marijuana, and three-quarters of a 
mile from “possibly the hottest spot on the Mexican border for smuggling”—
had crossed the border with the marijuana. Id. at 894. He reasoned that, be-
cause the agent’s testimony about the “hot spot” was based on “anecdotal ex-
periences in four prior investigations,” it amounted to “statistical evidence” 
that “[c]ourts have been hesitant to admit . . . because of the ease with which 
it can be abused.” Id. at 895–96. 
 7. PANEL ON STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS, 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESS-
MENTS AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS 215 (Stephen E. Fienberg ed., 1989). For a 
more complete description of the panel’s work, see D.H. Kaye, Improving Legal 
Statistics, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1255, 1260–63 (1990). For reviews of psycho-
logical research into the alleged tendency of jurors to overvalue probability 
evidence, see David H. Kaye & Jonathan J. Koehler, Can Jurors Understand 
Probabilistic Evidence?, 154(A) J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y 75 (1991); William C. 
Thompson, Are Juries Competent to Evaluate Statistical Evidence?, 52 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1989). 
 8. See State v. Alt, 505 N.W.2d 72, 72 (Minn. 1993); State v. Johnson, 
498 N.W.2d 10, 14 (Minn. 1993); State v. Jobe, 486 N.W.2d 407, 419–20 (Minn. 
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“the infamous Dreyfus case” proved that if “an erroneous statis-
tical probability plays any significant role in the conviction of 
an innocent person, the error has not only destroyed the life of 
the innocent person but has in some sense dehumanized the 
community.”9 
The case in question is the court-martial of French Army 
Captain Alfred Dreyfus at the turn of the nineteenth century.10 
It is a case of such injustice that it toppled a government. But 
despite its legend in the literature on legal statistics, Dreyfus is 
not a case of mathematics run amok, unchecked and uncom-
prehended. To the contrary, the defects in the mathematical 
proof were dramatically exposed, and this evidence did not lead 
Dreyfus’s judges to condemn him. Accordingly, Dreyfus’s con-
trived conviction, as intolerable as it was, does not militate 
against the admission of “probability evidence.” 
  THE DREYFUS CASES: AN OVERVIEW   
Dreyfus is not a single case, but rather a series of con-
nected military, civil, and criminal proceedings.11 They began 
in 1894 with a court-martial that convicted Dreyfus of trans-
mitting military secrets to Germany and sentenced him to life 
imprisonment on Devil’s Island.12 The verdict, which was 
tainted by a secret dossier, fabricated evidence, and widespread 
anti-Semitism in the French army and populace, became an in-
 
1992); State v. Nielsen, 467 N.W.2d 615, 619–20 (Minn. 1991); State v. 
Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 428–29 (Minn. 1989). 
 9. State v. Bloom, 516 N.W.2d 159, 173 (Minn. 1994) (Coyne, J., dissent-
ing). The majority of the court held that an expert may testify to the frequency 
of occurrence of a DNA profile when this frequency is computed according to a 
“conservative” procedure devised by a committee of the National Research 
Council. Id. at 160–61 (majority opinion) (citing COMM. ON DNA TECH. IN FO-
RENSIC SCI., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCI-
ENCE (1992)). Not long after that, a second committee wrote that this “ceiling” 
procedure was not necessary; in its view, more extreme probabilities could be 
justified scientifically. COMM. ON DNA FORENSIC SCIENCE: AN UPDATE, NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 35 
(1996). 
 10. Histories of the Dreyfus affair are plentiful and opinionated. A de-
tailed account is given by a Parisian lawyer and professor in JEAN-DENIS 
BREDIN, THE AFFAIR: THE CASE OF ALFRED DREYFUS (Jeffrey Mehlman trans., 
George Braziller 1986) (1983). A shorter essay that focuses on the legal pro-
ceedings is Benjamin F. Martin, The Dreyfus Affair and the Corruption of the 
French Legal System, in THE DREYFUS AFFAIR: ART, TRUTH, AND JUSTICE 37 
(Norman L. Kleeblatt ed., 1987). 
 11. See Martin, supra note 10, at 40–48. 
 12. BREDIN, supra note 10, at 92–102, 113. 
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ternational cause célèbre.13 As evidence of Dreyfus’s innocence 
began to mount and as it became known that French military 
authorities had manufactured additional evidence to keep the 
case from being reopened, the French army and government 
were shaken.14 The discovery of one forgery, purporting to be a 
letter from an Italian military attaché, prompted the suicide of 
the colonel working in military intelligence who had prepared it 
and produced the resignations of the chief of the Army’s Gen-
eral Staff and the Minister of War.15 
France’s highest court, the Cour de Cassation, sitting en 
banc as a result of special legislation, vacated the judgment of 
the military court.16 After five years of brutal conditions on 
Devil’s Island, Dreyfus returned to a second court-martial.17 At 
Rennes in 1899, this court again found Dreyfus guilty of trea-
son.18 Issuing a compromise verdict referring to extenuating 
circumstances (and prompting Dreyfus to ask “Since when have 
there been ‘extenuating circumstances’ for treason?”), the court 
sentenced Dreyfus to another five years’ confinement.19 The 
verdict was so poorly received that within two weeks the Presi-
dent of the Republic pardoned Dreyfus.20 
After further political upheavals and a War Office report 
finding that most of the evidence at Rennes either did not re-
late to Dreyfus or had been altered to make it appear that it 
did, the Cour de Cassation granted a petition for review.21 In 
1906, declaring that no credible evidence of treason ever ex-
isted, the court annulled the verdict of the Rennes court-
martial.22 Dreyfus, the man twice convicted of treason, re-
turned to the army and was awarded the cross of the Legion of 
Honor.23 
 
 13. Id. at 92–110. 
 14. Id. at 114–20. 
 15. Id. at 328–34. 
 16. Id. at 381–83. 
 17. Id. at 388–97. 
 18. Id. at 427. 
 19. LOUIS L. SNYDER, THE DREYFUS CASE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
335–36 (1973). 
 20. BREDIN, supra note 10, at 433–34. 
 21. Id. at 456–65. 
 22. Martin, supra note 10, at 47 (arguing that this judgment of acquittal, 
as opposed to remanding the case to the army, was procedurally improper but 
politically expedient). 
 23. BREDIN, supra note 10, at 481–85. 
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  BERTILLON’S ANALYSIS OF THE BORDEREAU   
The document that initiated the 1894 prosecution was a 
letter, known as the bordereau.24 Retrieved from a wastepaper 
basket in the German embassy, the bordereau listed several 
relatively unimportant documents about French artillery and 
troops.25 French intelligence officers decided that Dreyfus was 
the culprit. (Why not? He was a Jew and an Alsatian.)26 They 
collected and contrived evidence to support this thesis and ig-
nored or suppressed all contrary evidence.27 The resulting dos-
sier was sufficient to convince the French government to con-
vene the 1894 court-martial.28 
Handwriting experts contacted by the army and the Minis-
try of Justice studied the bordereau and reached conflicting 
conclusions.29 The most notorious analysis came from Alphonse 
Bertillon, the head of the Bureau of Identification in the Paris 
Police Department.30 Bertillon claimed that Dreyfus wrote the 
bordereau in a way that would make it look like a forgery of his 
own handwriting.31 Bertillon advanced this “self-forgery” the-
ory at both of Dreyfus’s military trials and also at the criminal 
libel trial of the novelist, Emile Zola, for his vitriolic public let-
ter, J’accuse, which denounced the army for “one of the greatest 
iniquities of the century” in its handling of the Dreyfus case.32 
To Bertillon, the proof of “self-forgery” was scientific, in-
contestable and infallible—in a word, geométrique.33 According 
to the leading account in U.S. legal literature, this proof in-
cluded computations of the probabilities of selected coinci-
dences “between the lengths of certain words and letters in [the 
bordereau] and the lengths of certain words and letters in cor-
respondence taken from Dreyfus’[s] home.”34 Furthermore, 
from “[o]bscure lexicographical and graphological ‘coincidences’ 
 
 24. Id. at 59–69. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. The actual author was a French officer named Esterhazy who was 
providing information to the German military attaché. Id. at 318. 
 28. Id. at 65–69. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Bertillon achieved fame as the inventor of a system of identifying in-
dividuals from various body measurements. See, e.g., HENRY T.F. RHODES, 
ALPHONSE BERTILLON: FATHER OF SCIENTIFIC DETECTION 88–95 (1968). 
 31. BREDIN, supra note 10, at 73–74. 
 32. See SNYDER, supra note 19, at 185–90. 
 33. BREDIN, supra note 10, at 74. 
 34. Tribe, supra note 5, at 1332. 
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within the document itself,” Bertillon divined that the letter 
contained coded information.35 
  For example, [he] stressed the presence of four coincidences out of 
the [twenty-six] initial and final letters of the [thirteen] repeated 
polysyllabic words in the [bordereau]. He evaluated at .2 the probabil-
ity of an isolated coincidence and calculated a probability of (0.2)4 = 
.0016 that four such coincidences would occur in normal writing.36 
Likewise, to establish that the letters had been traced over 
the word intérêt as it appeared in a letter in Dreyfus’s brother’s 
handwriting, Bertillon “computed the ‘amazing’ frequency with 
which certain letters in the [bordereau] appeared over the same 
letters of the word chain constructed by repeating intérêt a 
number of times, once a variety of complex adjustments had 
been made.”37 
 
 35. Id. at 1332–33; see also Mary W. Gray, Statistics and the Law: Intui-
tive Views of Evidence May Be Altered by Mathematical Analysis, 56 MATHE-
MATICS MAG. 67, 68 (1983); Elmer B. Mode, Probability and Criminalistics, 58 
J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 628, 639 (1963). Gray and Mode rely on a 1928 account, 
E.R. Hedrick, The Reality of Mathematical Processes, in THE NATIONAL COUN-
CIL OF TEACHERS OF MATHEMATICS: THE THIRD YEARBOOK 35, 40–41 (1928), 
which notes the frequency of the letters of the French alphabet within the 
bordereau as contrasted with the proportions found in typical French prose as 
constituting the statistical evidence against Dreyfus. Id. I found no references 
to such testimony in the documents collected in LA REVISION DU PROCÈS DE 
RENNES (1909). See also infra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 36. Tribe, supra note 5, at 1333 n.8. Other writers are less clear on the 
details of Bertillon’s purported demonstration and decryption of the letter. See, 
e.g., MICHAEL BURNS, DREYFUS: A FAMILY AFFAIR 138 (1991) (“Bertillon also 
maintained that clues to the traitor’s finances were embedded in the docu-
ment’s lettering. Without explaining his method, he announced that Dreyfus 
had received the sum of five hundred thousand francs.”). A more recent ac-
count suggests that the calculation involving the twenty-six polysyllabic words 
did not relate to some code involving initial and final letters, as described by 
Professor Tribe, but rather to the positioning of the words on the paper: 
After having traced on the “bordereau” with five mm interval vertical 
lines, Bertillon showed that some pairs of polysyllabic words (among 
twenty-six) had the same relative position with respect to this grid. 
Making allusion to the theory of probability, Bertillon stated that 
these coincidences could not be attributed to a normal handwrit-
ing. . . . After his deposition, Bertillon gave an example of the prob-
ability calculation: if the individual probability for one coincidence is 
set to 0.2, then the probability of observing four coincidences is (0.2)4 
= 0.0016.  
F. Taroni et al., Forerunners of Bayesianism in Forensic Science, 38 JURIMET-
RICS J. 183, 189 (1998) (discussing Déposition Bertillon (du 18 janvier, 2 
février, 4 février et 6 février 1899), in LA REVISION DU PROCÈS DREYFUS—
ENQUÊTE DE LA COUR DE CASSATION 482, 482–500 (P.V. Stock ed., 1899)); see 
also COLIN G.G. AITKEN & FRANCO TARONI, STATISTICS AND THE EVALUATION 
OF EVIDENCE FOR FORENSIC SCIENTISTS 123 (2d ed. 2004). 
 37. Tribe, supra note 5, at 1333. 
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  THE IMPACT OF BERTILLON’S TESTIMONY   
Bertillon’s recondite analysis may have had some impact in 
the first court-martial before the defense had the opportunity to 
examine his work carefully. The principal exponent of this view 
is the novelist Armand Charpentier, who wrote that Dreyfus’s 
counsel, two observers from the General Staff, and the prose-
cuting attorney “afterwards declared that they had not under-
stood a word of Bertillon’s demonstration.”38 As for the judges, 
Charpentier merely states that “it may reasonably be supposed 
that [they] were equally mystified,” and he remarks that in any 
event, “they . . . allowed themselves to be impressed by the sci-
entific phraseology of the system.”39 
Since the 1894 proceedings were closed to the public and 
were not transcribed, Charpentier’s attributions seem some-
what speculative. Moreover, most accounts of the court-martial 
identify a dramatic announcement by a high-ranking intelli-
gence official that an “honorable person” informed him that 
Dreyfus was a traitor as the event that swayed the previously 
doubtful tribunal.40 Bertillon’s performance is rarely depicted 
as being even remotely persuasive.41 
 
 38. ARMAND CHARPENTIER, THE DREYFUS CASE 53 (J. Lewis May trans., 
1935) (1933). 
 39. Id. The British historian, Guy Chapman, provides a slightly different 
account: 
[Bertillon’s system] was complex and needed a lot of explanation with 
the aid of diagrams and blackboards. The court heard him through for 
an hour, stunned by his unintelligible verbosity. All they understood 
was that Bertillon believed that Dreyfus had forged the bordereau in 
a mixture of his own hand and those of his wife and brother. 
GUY CHAPMAN, THE DREYFUS TRIALS 48 (1972). 
 40. E.g., BREDIN, supra note 10, at 94 (noting that this baseless testimony 
was “the stroke of the bludgeon that brought Dreyfus down” (translating AR-
MAND CHARPENTIER, LES COTÉS MYSTÉRIEUX DE L’AFFAIRE DREYFUS 70 
(1930))). 
 41. See, e.g., BURNS, supra note 36, at 138 (“Looking on, the prisoner 
[Dreyfus] attached no importance to Bertillon’s testimony; he considered it, as 
did most observers, ‘the work of a madman.’” (translated from ALFRED DREY-
FUS, CINQ ANNÉES DE MA VIE 69 (F. Maspero 1982) (1901))); NICHOLAS HA-
LASZ, CAPTAIN DREYFUS: THE STORY OF A MASS HYSTERIA 51 (1955) (“[T]he 
testimony was not hurting him . . . . Bertillon entangled the court in a highly 
‘scientific’ explanation of why the dissimilarities between Dreyfus’[s] hand-
writing and the handwriting on the bordereau proved that Dreyfus had been 
disguising his handwriting. No one could follow it, and after a while everyone 
gave up trying.”); MARTIN P. JOHNSON, THE DREYFUS AFFAIR: HONOUR AND 
POLITICS IN THE BELLE ÉPOQUE 27 (1999) (“Bertillon . . . apparently made a 
bad impression with the court.”). 
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Although the actual impact of Bertillon’s pseudo-science in 
the first court-martial is difficult to gauge, in all the subse-
quent proceedings, other experts exposed Bertillon’s “proofs” as 
vacuous.42 In the Rennes court-martial, for example, a letter 
provided by the world-renowned mathematician, Henri Poin-
caré, identified “colossal errors” in Bertillon’s analysis and 
flatly declared that no unprejudiced person with a scientific 
education could possibly find any merit in it.43 In a meticulous 
report prepared at the request of the Cour de Cassation, Poin-
caré and two other distinguished scholars showed that the sup-
posedly improbable coincidences said to confirm Dreyfus’s au-
thorship of the bordereau were of the type and frequency to be 
expected when one searches for any and all coincidences.44 For 
instance, the relevant probability of the four coincidences in the 
initial and final letters of the thirteen polysyllabic words is not 
.0016. That figure is the probability of exactly four coincidences 
in four words. The probability of four or more out of thirteen is 
approximately .7, indicating that such “coincidences” are com-
mon.45 
Thus, the Dreyfus case is a clear example of an early abuse 
of probability theory, but it is not a compelling example of 
 
 42. Those who describe the expert testimony as directed to the relative 
frequencies of specific letters report that eminent mathematicians explained to 
the court that, while the precise distribution of letters in the allegedly coded 
message may have been unusual, some such departure from the average was 
not especially unlikely. Among the many possible proportions in which the let-
ters might appear, any particular set of proportions—even the most likely—is 
individually improbable. To appreciate this point, consider tossing a balanced 
coin 100 times. The single most probable outcome is fifty heads and fifty tails, 
but its probability is less than ten percent. Thus, the mathematician Painlévé, 
who was to become Prime Minister of France, reputedly declared: “Give me the 
works of Racine and I will show you that he, too, by your foolish tests is a trai-
tor, for the works of Racine, like the letters of Dreyfus, do not show the most 
probable distribution.” Gray, supra note 35, at 68 (citing Hedrick, supra note 
35, at 41); Mode, supra note 35, at 639 (citing Hedrick, supra note 35, at 41). 
Although it makes a good story, the account of Bertillon’s claim of a coded 
message and Painlévé’s eloquent dismissal of it could be apocryphal. The late 
statistician William Kruskal searched without success for an authoritative 
source of the quotation reported by Hedrick. A sample of his inquiries attempt-
ing to document this quotation is available from the author. 
 43. LA REVISION DU PROCÈS DE RENNES, RÉQUISITOIRE ÉCRIT DE M. LE 
PROCUREUR GÉNÉRAL BAUDOUIN 116–17 (1907). 
 44. Tribe, supra note 5, at 1333; Examen Critique Des Divers Systemes Ou 
Etudes Graphologiques Auxquels a Donne Lieu Le Bordereau: Rapport de Mm. 
Darboux, Appell, et Poincaré, in 3 L’AFFAIRE DREYFUS: LA REVISION DU 
PROCÈS DE RENNES 500 (1909). 
 45. Tribe, supra note 5, at 1333 n.8. 
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judges or jurors beguiled and bemused by mathematics into 
convicting an innocent person. The courts-martial and related 
proceedings were so imbued with anti-Semitism, political 
machinations, and outright perjury, forgery, and fabrications 
that the mathematical errors pale in significance.46 Bertillon’s 
forensic forays were more often greeted with ridicule than re-
spect.47 In the Zola trial, for instance, the reaction to Bertillon’s 
testimony about the “infallible and transcendent method of 
graphology” was “laughter from the audience.”48 At the Rennes 
court-martial, one witness, a skilled draftsman, showed that 
Bertillon’s measurements of the spacing and positions of letters 
were inaccurate, and another expert 
by applying Bertillon’s argument to any page of writing taken up at 
random, succeeded in demonstrating geometrically and infallibly that 
that page was a forgery. To the accompaniment of the laughter of the 
whole court, he made use of a page of M. Bertillon’s own report for his 
demonstration! Learned members of the Institute and professors at 
the Ecole des Chartes also gave evidence which completely destroyed 
Bertillon’s deposition . . . .49 
It is not surprising, then, that most accounts do not identify the 
mathematical testimony as an important cause of the convic-
tions.50 
 
 46. Martin, supra note 10, at 45–46. Martin describes the Rennes trial as 
follows: 
Brought back from his hellish prison stay, Dreyfus appeared a broken 
man and inspired little confidence. In contrast, the military officers 
who testified against him . . . were much more impressive. Because of 
the lax rules of evidence, they were permitted to make impassioned 
denunciations and to repeat hearsay, much of it long since discred-
ited. Trained magistrates might have sorted through the maze of tes-
timony, but the seven officers on the court-martial board were hardly 
that. The prosecution argued that Dreyfus’s guilt was proved not by a 
single document or act but by a cat’s cradle of evidence that resolved 
into a pattern indicating that he was a traitor. Unable to discredit 
every accusation and every document, the defense could not prevail 
against this nebulous case. 
Id. 
 47. JACQUES KAYSER, THE DREYFUS AFFAIR 346–47 (Nora Bickley trans., 
1931). 
 48. SNYDER, supra note 19, at 300. At the end of his testimony, “the un-
happy Bertillon withdrew amid hoots of laughter . . . .” BREDIN, supra note 10, 
at 262. 
 49. KAYSER, supra note 47, at 346–47 (“[A]ll [these experts] were agreed 
in declaring once again that the [b]ordereau was written by Esterhazy.”); see 
also SNYDER, supra note 19, at 305 (“The experts had done an effective job in 
ridiculing Bertillon’s evidence.”). 
 50. See, e.g., BREDIN, supra note 10; CHAPMAN, supra note 39. But see 
Tribe, supra note 5, at 1333–34 (citing CHARPENTIER, supra note 38, at 52–53, 
for the view that the 1899 Rennes court was “mystified” and “impressed by the 
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Flimsy accusations, supported only by vague character evi-
dence, fabricated hearsay, forged documents, and pathological 
science, make the Dreyfus affair a fascinating chapter in legal 
history. But it is a poor example of the supposed power of 
mathematics to paralyze critical thought and to insulate itself 
from effective refutation. If anything, the Dreyfus cases demon-
strate that forensic abuses of applied probability can be de-
tected and corrected. 
This reconstruction of the events in Dreyfus does not mean 
that probability evidence is innocuous and should be routinely 
admitted. A single set of proceedings, conducted under the 
glare of publicity in a highly politicized atmosphere, could 
hardly support so sweeping a claim. But neither can the Drey-
fus cases be relied on for the proposition that “probability evi-
dence” is too mystifying to be admissible. The apparent consen-
sus in the legal literature that the convictions are paradigmatic 
of the paralysis of “critical examination” induced by “mathe-
matical evidence”51 is, on balance, inconsistent with the histori-
cal record. Whether the dangers of such evidence are any 
greater than those of more conventional modes of proof remains 
an important question for the law of evidence,52 but the resolu-
 
scientific phraseology of the system”). Charpentier, however, was speculating 
about the 1894 Paris court-martial. See supra text accompanying notes 38–39. 
In the 1899 court martial at Rennes, Bertillon was called as the sixty-first 
witness. SNYDER, supra note 19, at 300. He “went into a long-winded defense 
in incomprehensible and unintelligible terms of his ‘infallible system.’” Id. Ac-
cording to a contemporaneous report in the London Times, Bertillon was 
absolutely, even ridiculously unintelligible. . . . The Judges and the 
counsel for the defense assumed an attitude of unimpeachable cor-
rectness, and did their best to understand. The public and the jour-
nalists, on the contrary, after an hour’s heroic effort . . . gave up the 
task and repaired to the courtyard of the Lycée, there to exchange 
ideas on the possibility of human credulity. 
Id. at 301. The next two experts to testify did “an effective job in ridiculing 
Bertillon’s evidence.” Id. at 305. The first “demonstrated with the aid of a 
blackboard the fallacy of Bertillon’s calculations.” Id. at 305–06. The second 
“aroused laughter by showing a page borrowed from a report by Bertillon him-
self and confusing him with it.” Id. at 306. Likewise, in describing the 1899 
trial, Charpentier writes that several experts, including Poincaré, “exposed 
the incoherence and stupidity of Bertillon’s system.” CHARPENTIER, supra note 
38, at 233; see also id. at 265 (“The Court did not attach very much weight to 
Bertillon’s far-fetched demonstrations.”); OCTAVE MIRBEAU, L’AFFAIRE DREY-
FUS 302 n.2 (1990) (“Au procès de Rennes, sa déposition incohérente le fera 
considérer comme fou par tous les spectateurs non prévenus.”). 
 51. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 52. See, e.g., United States v. Morrow, 374 F. Supp. 2d 51, 63 (D.D.C. 
2005) (rejecting the defendant’s motion to exclude testimony about a DNA 
identification because of the possibility of confusion over the odds of a DNA 
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tion of this issue should no longer be influenced by a dubious 
reconstruction of the past. 
 
match, but indicating a willingness to reconsider the issue at trial); United 
States v. Coleman, 202 F. Supp. 2d 962, 971 (E.D. Mo. 2002) (finding that a 
geneticist’s testimony in a case involving mitochondrial DNA identification 
that there is a “95 percent chance that 99.93 percent of the people in North 
America don’t have the sequence associated with [the defendant]” would not 
be unfairly prejudicial), aff ’d, 349 F.3d 1077 (8th Cir. 2003); KAYE ET AL., THE 
NEW WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 12.4.1(a); Daniel Shaviro, Statistical-
Probability Evidence and the Appearance of Justice, 103 HARV. L. REV. 530 
passim (1989); Symposium, Debate on Statistics and Evidentiary Theory, 65 
TUL. L. REV. 457 passim (1991). 
